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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THEj CASE 
The appellant, Roy M. Helm, appeals from a judgment 
entered against him in the Second Judicial District of Utah, the 
i 
Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding, following a conviction for 
tampering with evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on March 26, 1976, 
of tampering with evidence in violation of Utah Code Anno., Sec. 
76-8-510 (1953), and sentenced April 19, 1&76. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his Conviction for tamper-
ing with evidence or in the alternatuve a determination that the 
lower court was without jurisdiction to sentence the appellant 
on the date that sentence was imposed and, therefore, the sen-* 
tence should be vacated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant stipulated to certain testimony 
to be admitted at trial as follows (p. 12-14 TT): 
That on the evening of September 4, 1974, Trooper Owen 
Busch had probable cause to stop a vehicle in Davis County, State 
of Utah; that he stopped the vehicle and oblserved that the driver 
was one Willard Eccles; thereafter, Trooper Busch took some notes 
pertaining to what he observed; that Trooper Busch recorded the 
notes; that Trooper Busch had Mr, Eccles perform some field sobriety 
tests, or performance tests, and took notes of what he observed; 
that all these notes and others were recorded on forms similar to 
plaintiff's Exhibit "A"; that he then took Mr, Eccles in Buschfs 
vehicle, turned on a tape recorder and placed Mr. Eccles under 
arrest for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages; 
that Officer Busch made arrangements to have Mr, Eccles1 vehicle 
impounded for safekeeping and that he radioed for the assistance 
of one Sergeant Odell Hatch to come to the scene; that Trooper 
Busch then recorded an interview with Mr, Eccles; that Trooper 
Busch wrote out a traffic citation to Mr, Eccles for driving under 
the influence of intoxicants; that Mr. Eccles showed him a badge 
and stated that he was the Chairman of the Highway Patrol Civil 
Service Commission; that shortly after this Sergeant Hatch arrived 
in his car; that both officers then took Mr. Eccles in Officer 
Busch's vehicle to the Davis County Jail for purposes of booking 
Mr. Eccles; that on the way to the jail Mr. Eccles stated to the 
police officers, "Aren't you afraid of losing your jobs?'1; that 
at all times during which Sergeant Hatch participated in the arrest 
he was aware that Mr, Eccles was, in fact, the Chairman of the High-
way Patrol Civil Service Commission; that Mr. Eccles was, in fact, 
Vice President of First Security Bank and had told Officer Busch 
that; and finally, that the officers and Mr. Eccles, in fact, 
arrived at the jail. 
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After this testimony had been stipulated to, Officer 
Busch testified that on arrival at the jail Mr. Eccles wished 
to use the phone (p. 17 TT); that Mr. Eccles attempted to reach 
Commissioner Raymond Jackson but failed toi reach him; that Mr. 
Eccles then reached Colonel Helm's home by phone and spoke with 
someone; that 10 minutes later a call came for Mr. Eccles at the 
jail; that after Mr. Eccles finished speakingf he handed the phone 
to Officer Busch; that Officer Busch could|not remember any part 
of the conversation Mr. Eccles had on the $hone; that when Officer 
Busch spoke on the phone, he spoke to Colonel Helm,and defendant 
stipulated to that fact. 
Officer Busch further testified ihat Colonel Helm asked 
him to go to another room in the jailhouse to speak to him (p.18 TT); 
Colonel Helm asked him if anyone had seen l}im bring Mr, Eccles 
into the jailhouse. When Officer Busch responded in the negative, 
Colonel Helm told the Officer Busch to get 
jailhouse (p. 19 TT). 
Officer Busch then testified that he and Officer Hatch 
discussed the conversation that Officer Bus|ch had just had with 
Colonel Helm and then the two officers took Mr. Eccles in Officer 
Busch fs vehicle to the parking lot of Farmeprs State Bank on Fifth 
South and about Sixth West in Bountiful, Utfch. 
Officer Buschfs testimony was that appellant arrived 
at the Farmers State Bank some 10 minutes atter the officers and 
Mr. Eccles out of the 
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Mr- Eccles had (p, 20 TT) . Officer Busch left his vehicle and 
entered appellant's automobile and the two conversed for about 
10 minutes. During the course of the conversation appellant asked 
Officer Busch the question, "What do you have on this?ff according 
to Officer Busch's testimony Cp« 21 TT)• Officer Busch responded 
by returning to his vehicle and retrieving his field notes and 
tape recording and bringing them back to Colonel Helm's car. 
Officer Busch then testified that after Colonel Helm examined 
the notes he asked Officer Busch to request Sergeant Hatch to 
speak with Colonel Helm Cp. 22 TT) . Busch layed the notes and 
tape on the seat and left* 
After Colonel Helm and Sergeant Hatch finished speak-
ing , Officer Busch testified that he rejoined the two men outside 
of Colonel Helm*s automobile where the three men decided that 
Colonel Helm would handle the situation (pp, 23, 39-41 TT). 
Sergeant Hatch testified that shortly thereafter, Mr. Eccles 
left Officer Busch's car and the two officers then left the area 
(p. 41 TT). 
Sergeant Hatch testified that he was aware of the notes 
and tape recordings that Officer Busch had accumulated and that 
although they were in Officer Busch's car when they were on 
their way to the Farmers State Bank in Bountiful, they were not 
in the automobile when they left the Farmers State Bank parking 
lot (pp. 42, 43 TT). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT 
NOT TO HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL AS A MATTER OF LAW AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE BECAUSE THE 
STATE DID NOT PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS 
OF ITS CASE. 
Defendant, Roy M, Helm, was charged with violation of 
Utah Code Ann,, § 76-8-510, which reads in part; 
"76-8-510, Tampering with evidence. - A per-
son commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investi-
gation is pending or about to be instituted, he; 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, 6r removes 
anything with a purpose to impaijf its verity 
or availability in the proceeding or investi-
gation; " 
It is clear from the face of the statute that some very 
critical elements must be established before anyone can be con-
victed of a violation of this section of tide penal code- Those 
elements are; 
1. That the person believe that ian official proceeding 
or investigation is pending qr about to be insti-
tuted ; 
2. That there be an altercation, destruction, conceal-
ment or removal of evidence; 
3. That there was a specific purpose for those actions; 
4. That the purpose be to impair! the evidence; 
5. That the impairment either alters, destroys, con-
ceals or removes the ver^t^ ofr availability of 
the evidence. 
- 5 -
As a matter of law the State simply had not met its 
burden of introducing evidence on these elements. 
As to the first element, the State did not even attempt 
to illicit evidence of any kind that an investigation or official 
proceeding was pending when the evidence was allegedly treated 
in the fashion described by the second element of the statute 
as numbered in this Brief. On the contrary, all of the evi-
dence given by Officer Busch indicates that the investigation 
was over. Officer Busch had collected all the information that 
was required to issue a citation and arrest Mr, Eccles. The 
difference between an investigation and an official proceeding 
is that an investigation gathers evidence that can be used in 
an official proceeding or to effect an arrest and further, that 
an investigation is not a proceeding in which action is taken 
against anyone. People v. Orr, 103 Cal. Rptr. 266, 26 Cal. App. 3d 
849 (1972); People v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1085, 
98 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1971); Meunier v. Bernich, LA, App,, 170 
So. 567 (1936); Bowles v. Baer, C C A , 111, 142 F,2d 787 (1944); 
Atchison, T. & S, F, Ry. Co. v. Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, 
529 P.2d 666. 215 Kan. 911 (1974); Mason v. Peaslee, 173 Cal. App. 2 
587, 343 P.2d 805, p. 808, n.2 (1959), In any type of proceed-
ing, whether criminal, civil, or administrative, the definition 
of investigation is always the same - a procedure for gathering 
information or evidence. It is clear, is it not, that the investi-
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gation in this case was over. Even if characterized as an offi-
cial proceeding, it was over. In fact, Sergeant Hatch testified 
that only one of two things was done in a traffic case - issue 
a ticket or swear out a complaint (p. 44 TT). Officer Busch 
testified that he had already issued a ticket, but he did not 
file a complaint. In other words, no investigation was pending 
or about to be instituted, nor was any official proceeding pend-
ing or about to be instituted, and no evidence was introduced to 
show either. 
Similarly, the second element of the statute was not 
met. No evidence was introduced to show alteration or destruction 
or concealment. The only evidence introduced was to show that 
evidence was moved from one car to another, 
Assuming arguendo that the secon4 element is met by 
movement of the evidence, it must still be 
element or intent. At no point in the tridl does the State proffer 
any evidence as to defendant's intent. Quijte rightly, the legis-
lature did not wish to make all movement of evidence a felony, 
but only those with the requisite and avowdd purpose of obstruct-
ing justice. Yet with this clear mandate from the legislature, 
the State does not even bother to submit evidence on the issue. 
The fourth and fifth elements of the statute are simi-
larly bereft of substantiation. First of all, no showing has 
tied to the third 
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been made in any manner that defendant attempted to alter the 
verity of the evidence. To show that the State would almost 
have to produce the evidence or in some way submit a comparison 
of two conflicting statments or materials, This was not done. 
Furthermore, the only evidence dealing with availability was 
that the evidence ended up in defendant^ automobile. On cross-
examination Officer Busch testified that he had never even asked 
the defendant where the evidence was, if he could have it back, 
or that anyone had even approached defendant on the subject 
(p. 27 TT). What impairment has taken place? Under the structure 
of the statute there could be no impairment without a showing 
of intent and none appears in the record. 
Appellant, therefore, contends that the State as a 
matter of law had not met its burden of proving and,in this case, 
of even introducing evidence on the elements of the statute under 
which appellant was charged either by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and much less by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Although 
arguable that defendant might have been guilty of other offenses, 
appellant submits that as a matter of law he was not proven 
guilty of the offense charged in this indictment. 
- 8 -
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE STATE DID PROVE ALL THE 
ELEMENTS OF ITS CASE, IT WAS STILL 
REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURT NOT TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL AS A MATTER Of LAW BE-
CAUSE OFFICER BUSCH, SERGEANT HATCH, 
AND DEFENDANT WERE INVOLVED IN A CON-
SPIRACY AND THEIR TESTIMONY|WAS NOT 
CORROBORATED• 
A, 
The Utah Statute dealing with conspiracy is Section 
76-12-1,3, Utah Code Anno, (1953). At faci value the act not 
only requires an agreement, but also an ac^» Voluntariness 
is also required as opposed to forced acquiescence. But there 
is no case law which indicates that a defease to a conspiracy 
charge exists because one of the conspirators really didn't 
have "his heart in it" or that "really" in 
but felt obligated by a superior order of the kind alleged in 
this case. If the Vietnam War has taught this country anything, 
it is that Mai Lai stands for the proposition that no superior 
officer can issue any command which is against the law and a 
his heart he objected 
junior officer be forced or feel obligated 
mand. If he does, the junior is as guilty 
Although at Mai Lai this country was faced 
there is no reason to not treat a felony of| 
to follow that com-
as his superior, 
jwith acts of murder, 
miscarriage or 
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interference with justice in any different mannerf In essence, 
the State attempted to excuse the conspiracy on the basis that 
the junior officers felt obligated to carry out commands which 
were against the law. The tenor of all the testimony, fairly 
viewed, indicates that the two officers were, at the very least, 
conscious stricken about their actions. If this defense is 
allowed to resist the allegation of conspiracy, appellant submits 
that the people of Utah are at the mercy of any public official 
who wishes to be corrupt because their subordinates must follow 
their commands without objection. The integrity of our system 
of justice will be seriously impaired and respect by the people 
of Utah for law enforcement will be seriously affected. 
Officer Busch not only conspired in this crimer if in 
fact one occurred, but delayed filing a complaint for more than 
15 months. It was he who carried his own accumulated evidence 
to Colonel Helm's car. He knew where the evidence was and yet 
at no time, including December, 1975/when Mr, Eccles was finally 
charged, did he make any attempt to locate it or have it returned. 
Similarly, Sergeant Hatch knew that evidence was in the patrol 
car before they arrived at the Farmers State Bank parking lot, 
knew what the evidence was, and knew that the evidence was not 
in the patrol car when they left the scene. Whether he knew 
that Colonel Helm had the evidence or that Officer Busch disposed 
- 10, -
of it is immaterial. Something was amiss 
his evidence and yet he kept silent and ca| 
attention. 
if we are to believe 
lied it to no one's 
Furthermore, both officers testified that they spoke 
together with Colonel Helm and for whatever reason--and in this 
case the hollow ring of weak integrity—agreed that Colonel Helm 
would handle the matter; in fact, both testified that they indi-
cated they would not be offended if ColonejL Helm proceeded with 
the case, but defend now with testimonies <pf tortured conscience 
and feelings of duty to the Colonel. 
15A C.J.S. 756, Conspiracy, § 45^ has an appropriate 
response to this sort of weak and inappropriate defense: 
"...an assertion that there has been a failure 
to prove a corrupt motive on the part of one 
of the conspirators who participated in an un-
lawful act does not necessarily warrant the dir-
ection of a verdict of acquittal as to him. The 
fact that the motive of a party was not corrupt 
when he joined a conspiracy does not exculpate 
him if he remains a member thereof after learn-
ing of its illegality, since it i[ 
learning of the criminal nature of the scheme, 
to take some definite and positive step to 
withdraw from the venture. (emphasis added) 
1
 To be a member of a conspiracy one must 
have a knowledge of the conspiracy and of 
its object or purpose during its [continuance, 
since without such knowledge a criminal in-
tent cannot exist. So, to constitute the 
criminal intent necessary to establish a con-
spiracy to commit an act prohibited by statute, 
there must be both knowledge of the existence 
of the law and knowledge of its actual or 
intended violation, but, where the act to 
s his duty, after 
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be committed is in its very nature wrongful, 
knowledge of the prohibitory statute is not 
essential,ft 
Numerous authorities are listed for these statements 
of the law, and appellant submits that Utah law is not apposite. 
Certainly ignorance of the purpose of the conspiracy may be a 
defense, but that has not even been alleged in this case. 
One case, State v, Fertig, 120 Utah 224, 233 P.2d 347 
(1951) , contains language which might be interpreted as indicating 
that the co-conspirator must have his whole soul in the project. 
"However, the cooperation in the crime must 
be real, not merely apparent, and mere pre-
sence combined with knowledge that a crime 
is about to be committed or a mental appro-
bation while the will contributes nothing 
to the doing of the act will not of itself 
constitute one an accomplice." (emphasis 
added) 
Although such language might seem to require actual 
mental acquiescence in a total complete heartfelt manner; that 
is not the law. In that case the accused co-conspirator watched 
an act of sodomy. She did not participate. She was not an 
accomplice. As the evidence will show, that is not the case 
here. As a matter of law the Court should have ruled that a 
conspiracy existed in this case. 
B. 
The corroborating evidence must do more than cause a 
grave doubt upon the defendant, State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 
120 P.2d 285 (1941); State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986; 
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State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 P, 804; State v. Park, 
44 Utah 360, 140 P. 768; State v. Kimball, 45 Utah 443, 146 P. 
313; State v. Powell, 45 Utah 193, 143 P, 588; State v. Cox, 
74 Utah 149, 277 P, 972? State v. Gardner] 83 Utah 145, 27 P.2d 
51. 
In State v. Baran, 25 Ut,2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970) 
the Court said: 
"In State v. Sinclair this Court stated that 
the proper test to determine the sufficiency 
of the corroborating evidence was whether there 
was evidence independent of the testimony of 
the accomplice, which the jury could reasonably 
believe tended to implicate and connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the crime." 474 
P.2d at 729. 
In Baran, supra, outside witnesses could corroborate 
the testimony. State v. Pratt, 25 Ut.2d 76, 475 P.2d 1013 (1970); 
State v. Christean, Utah, 533 P.2d 872 (19t5); State 
v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1955); State v. Woodall, 
6 Ut.2d 8, 305 P.2d 473 (1956); State v. Sinclair, 15 Ut.2d 162, 
389 P.2d 465 (1964). In other cases the defendant himself has 
corroborated the evidence: Christean, supra; State v. Bruner, 
106 Utah 49, 145 P.2d 302 (1944); State v, Erwin, supra. 
In the case at bar no corroborating evidence exists• 
Appellant did not testify nor make any statements to police that 
were introduced into evidence. Furthermore, the only third party 
in this case was Captain John Rogers who would have verified 
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the conversation between himself and Sergeant Hatch indicating 
that Mr. Eccles was making calls and that Captain Rogers told 
the officer to proceed with his case. Nothing corroborates 
even the least signigicant element of tampering with evidence. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that the lower court as 
a matter of law should have dismissed the suit at the end of the 
State's case because as a matter of law a conspiracy was proven 
by the testimony adduced and there was no corroborating evi-
dence and no issue of fact on these questions was left for the 
jury to decide. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT WAS WITHOUT JURIS-
DICTION TO SENTENCE THE APPELLANT, 
The statute with respect to sentencing is 77-35-1, 
Utah Code Anno., (1953), and reads in pertinent parts; 
"After a verdict of guilty, if judgment is 
not arrested...the Court must appoint a 
time for pronouncing judgment, which must 
be at least two days and not more than ten 
days after the verdict." (emphasis added) 
In Herr v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 525 P.2d 728 (1974) 
the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the meaning of 
the word "shall" and following a United States Supreme Court 
case, Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S. Ct. 428, 91 L. Ed. 
436 (19 46), equated the word "shall" with the meaning of the 
word "must" which the Court held was a word of command and not 
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advisory. Although the Herr case is civil, it is difficult if 
not impossible to determine why a greater jpower should be given 
the word in a civil case to preserve a defendant's rights as 
opposed to a criminal case in which defendantfs rights are so 
much more deeply affected and destroyed ifi not strictly pro-
tected. 
It is true that the courts of Utfch have held in the 
past that this statute is merely advisory fcnd not jurisdictional, 
State v. Fedder, 1 Ut«2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953); State v. 
Saxton, 30 Ut.2d 456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974)t Appellant submits 
that the law has changed. In Saxtonf defendant absented himself 
to avoid the penalty of law and in Fedder defendant consented 
to the delay. Neither situation is true in this case. In fact, 
in this case defendant was not even aware that the time for 
sentencing had been postponed. 
Appellant submits that the circumstances of this case 
distinguish it from Sax ton and Fedder and tlhat in light of Kerr 
the meaning of the word ,fmustn is a command! and, therefore, the 
Court lost jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits the State did 
submit evidence on all the elements of its 
Court should have ruled as a matter of law 
not prove or even 
case and that the 
in defendant's favor, 
_ 15 -
Furthermore, if the Court felt that sufficient evidence was pre-
sented to go to the jury, it should have ruled as a matter of 
law that there was a conspiracy and absent corroborating evi-
dence , dismissed the charge. Lastly, appellant contends that 
the Court lost jurisdiction to sentence appellant, and that this 
Court should so find, 
illy submitted, 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
364-6474 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief 
to Attorney General of Utah, State of Utah, Utah State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84104, this 16th day of December, 
1976, postage prepaid. 
lobfert M. McRae 
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